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− | Calculated Risks, Measurable
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− | Results
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− | Sylvain Goulet, fcia, fsa
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− | Developing New Risks,
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− | Developing New Solutions
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− | New Reinsurance Solutions
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− | • 1 - Retakaful
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− | – From “Takaful” or Shari’ah compliant
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− | insurance
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− | – How can reinsurance help?
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− | • Traditional Risks, New Reinsurance
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− | – 2 - Increasing client retention
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− | – 3 - Vary Reinsurance portions (e.g. CI
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− | products)
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− | – 4 - Reinsurance derivatives
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− | New Reinsurance Solutions
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− | • New Insurance Risks, New
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− | Reinsurance Solutions?
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− | – 5 - Avian Inluenza / Pandemic Risk
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− | 1 - Takaful Insurance - Potential
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− | • Muslim Population
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− | – Between 1/5 and 1/4 of the world
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− | population
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− | – Mainly Asia, Africa and Middle East
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− | – About 1.6 million Muslims in Canada (5%)
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− | – About 3.0 million Muslims in the USA (1%)
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− | • Growth
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− | – One of the fastest growing segments in
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− | North America, particularly Canada
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− | 1 - Takaful Insurance
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− | • Insurance in Compliance with Shari’ah
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− | Law (Islam)
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− | • Shari’ah Law
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− | – Legal framework based on Muslim
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− | principles of jurisprudence
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− | – Legal theory established before the 19th
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− | century, or
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− | – Changing body and reflect current politics
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− | and economic realities
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− | 1 - Takaful Insurance
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− | • Insurance that is permissible under
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− | Shari’ah Law
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− | • Takaful
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− | – Arabic word: “joint guarantee” or
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− | “guarantee each other”
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− | – Although “insurance” is technically
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− | forbidden because it includes uncertainty,
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− | “mutual cooperation” and “pool
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− | contributions” are allowed for mutual
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− | benefits
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− |
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− | 1 - Takaful Insurance
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− | • Non-Permissible Elements
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− | – Uncertainty (“Gharar”): timing of payment,
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− | amount, or whether made or not
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− | – Gambling (“Maisir”): premiums could be
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− | seen as small when compared to the
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− | potential payout
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− | – Usury (“Riba”): not permitted under
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− | Shari’ah Law (note: does not contradict
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− | profits & capital gains)
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− | 1 - Takaful Insurance
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− | • Some Structural Solutions
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− | – Uncertainty (“Gharar”): ensure that some
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− | payments are made in one form or another
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− | – Gambling (“Maisir”): factor in some
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− | guarantees, Return of Premiums,
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− | participation in profits, etc.
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− | – Usury (“Riba”): use Shari’ah compliant
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− | funds (increasingly available)
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− |
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− | 1 - Takaful Insurance
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− | • Other Characteristics of Takaful
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− | – Must have a Shari’ah Board to uphold
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− | Islamic Law, and connection with an
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− | external Islamic Institute
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− | – Full disclosure of contract terms and profits
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− | distribution between the participants and
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− | the “Operator”
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− | – Reinsure with a Retakaful if available
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− | – “Window Operations” may be permitted
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− | 1 - Takaful Insurance - Potential
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− | Potential Takaful Distribution
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− | Malaysi
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− | a Pakista Singapor
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− | n e
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− | Indonesi Thailand
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− | a 1% Sri Lanka
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− | 0%
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− | Bahrain
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− | 1%
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− | Jorda
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− | n
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− | Kuwait
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− | 3%
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− | Oma
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− | n
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− | Qata
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− | r
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− | Saudi Arabia
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− | Bangladesh United 17%
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− | 6% Yemen Syria
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− | Arab 3%
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− | 0%
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− | Emirate
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− | 1 - Takaful Insurance - Wakalah Model
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− | 1 - Takaful Insurance - Mudharabah
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− | 1 - Takaful Insurance - Potential
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− | • Opportunities for Reinsurance
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− | – Takaful has been small but growing rapidly
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− | abroad
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− | – Growing demand because of “Shari’ah
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− | compliance” and increasing wealth
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− | – If Retakaful is available, then must use it
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− | – Retakaful has been almost non-existent,
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− | and therefore limiting the growth of Takaful
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− | – Canadian banks and credit unions already
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− | working on Shari’ah-compliant investments
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− | Traditional Risks,
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− | New Solutions
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− | 2 -Increasing Client’s Retention
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− | • Increasing Client’s Retention
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− | – By calendar year (built-in annual
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− | recapture)
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− | – Reduce reinsurance costs
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− | – Increase the partnership between the
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− | ceding co. and the reinsurer
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− |
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− | 2 -Increasing Client’s Retention
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− | 2,200
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− | Traditional Net Amount at Risk "A"
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− | 2,000
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− | 1,800
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− | 1,600
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− | Funds & Face Amount ($000)
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− | 1,400
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− | 1,200
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− | 1,000
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− | 800
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− | 600
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− | 400 Ceded Amount
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− | Cedant Retention
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− | 200 Fund
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− | 0
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− | 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
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− |
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− | 2 -Increasing Client’s Retention
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− | 2,200
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− | Projection of Net Amount at Risk "A"
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− | 2,000
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− | 1,800
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− | 1,600
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− | Funds & Face Amount ($000)
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− | 1,400
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− | 1,200
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− | 1,000
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− | 800
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− | 600
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− | 400 Ceded Amount
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− | Cedant Retention
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− | 200 Fund
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− | 0
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− | 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
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− |
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− | 2 -Increasing Client’s Retention
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− | 4,500
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− | Projection of Net Amount at Risk "B"
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− | 4,000
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− | 3,500
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− | Funds & Face Amount ($000,000)
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− | 3,000
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− | 2,500
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− | 2,000
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− | 1,500
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− | 1,000
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− | Ceded Amount
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− | Cedant Retention
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− | 500 Fund
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− | 0
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− | 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
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− |
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− | 2 -Increasing Client’s Retention
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− | • For the Cedant:
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− | – Reduce reinsurance costs
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− | – Retain participation in future mortality
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− | gains
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− | • For the Reinsurer
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− | – Increase the commitment of the reinsurer
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− | towards the cedant over the long-term
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− |
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− | 3 - Vary Reinsurance Portions
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− | • For Example: Critical Illness
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− | – Reduce reinsurance costs
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− | • Higher incidence, more predictable costs
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− | (Heart Attack, Stroke, Cancer)
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− | • Cedant could retain more
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− | – Reduce uncertainty
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− | • Lower incidence, more variable costs
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− | (Alzheimer’s disease, Renal disease,
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− | Parkinson’s disease)
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− | 3 - Vary Reinsurance Portions
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− | 3 - Vary Reinsurance Portions
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− | • For Example: Critical Illness
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− | – Could migrate to the same basis over time
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− | (10 years)
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− | • Can afford more risk over time
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− | • Create more harmonization over time
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− | • Develop more company experience
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− | 3 - Vary Reinsurance Portions
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− | 4 - Reinsurance Derivatives
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− | • Derivatives - Oxford:
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− | – (of a financial product) having a value
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− | deriving from an underlying variable asset :
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− | equity-based derivative products
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− | – (often derivatives) an arrangement or
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− | instrument (such as a future, option, or
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− | warrant) whose value derives from and is
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− | dependent on the value of an underlying
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− | asset
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− | • “Reinsurance” is a derivative
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− | 4 - Reinsurance Derivatives
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− | Insurer “A” Insurer “B”
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− | Reinsures with Reinsures with
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− | “R” Positive CFs “R” Negative CFs
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− | Reinsurer “R” mixes CFs from “A”
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− | & “B”, optimizes ALM, and return
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− | better derivatives in costs
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− | Reinsurer “R” retains profit as well
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− | 4 - Reinsurance Derivatives
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− | • Any Other Ideas of Reinsurance
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− | Derivatives:
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− | – Designed for Capital Efficiency
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− | – To optimize buying power
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− | – Use of captive capital markets (off-shore)
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− | – Etc.
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− |
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− | New Insurance Risks,
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− | New Reinsurance Solutions
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− |
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− | 5 - Avian Influenza / Pandemic Risk
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− | • pan=all / demos=people
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− | • Past Pandemics
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− | – Spanish Flu in 1918-19: ~40 m deaths
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− | – Asian Flu 1957: 1 million deaths
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− | – Hong Kong Flu 1968: 700,000 deaths
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− | • SARS
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− | – 8,098 people infected in 25 countries
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− | – 774 deaths
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− | – Large economic impact
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− | 5 - Avian Influenza / Pandemic Risk
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− | • 3 Conditions for a Pandemic
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− | – A new influenza virus for which there is no
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− | immunity among people
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− | – It must infect humans and cause illness
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− | – It must spread easily and be sustainable
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− | among humans
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− | 5 - Avian Influenza / Pandemic Risk
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− | • Mortality Gains
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− | – With possible cure of cancer and other
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− | critical illnesses, life expectancy could
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− | reach 120 years or more
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− | – Reinsurers can potentially realize huge
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− | mortality gains by deferral of payment or
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− | lapses
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− | – Huge asset base (reserves) on which to
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− | earn investment income
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− | 5 - Avian Influenza / Pandemic Risk
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− | • Mortality Losses
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− | – However, an Avian Influenza / Pandemic
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− | could easily eliminate mortality gains
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− | – A Gamble? The two risks are essentially
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− | different:
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− | • “Normal” day-to-day mortality, improving
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− | chances, slow process, or
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− | • “Abnormal” spike in death rates that last 2-3
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− | years (Spanish Flu in 1918-19:~40 million
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− | deaths in 60 countries, incl. 700,000
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− | Americans - that’s a 7/1000 death rate, or 1 in
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− | 150!)
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− | 5 - Avian Influenza / Pandemic Risk
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− | • Because of lower financial resources,
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− | low to medium income may be more
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− | affected
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− | – Smaller life insurance policies
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− | – Significant portion below retention
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− | • Can it be reinsured?
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− | – Much like “catastrophe” risks
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− | THANK YOU !
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